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I. INTRODUCTION
N late 1997, Congress passed the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Cen-
tral American Relief Act (NACARA).' The reaction of immigration
practitioners was mixed. One the one hand, the statute provided
much needed relief to Nicaraguan and Cuban immigrants. 2 On the other,
practitioners felt that the Act's provisions relating to immigrants from
other countries did not go far enough in protecting their interests.3 While
the consequences have yet to be determined with any certainty, NA-
CARA can be expected to change forever the landscape of American
immigration law. Its impact on certain Central American immigrants,
and the disparate treatment of favored groups, will have unintended con-
sequences for all who seek refuge under our banner of liberty.
Part II provides an introduction to the basic framework of immigration
law. It is intended to serve as a backdrop for understanding the mechan-
ics of NACARA and may be skimmed by the practitioner who is already
familiar with the terrain. Part III begins the treatment of the NACARA
statute itself, handling the broad issues related to the statute. Part IV
covers Nicaraguans and Cubans under NACARA (Section 202). Part V
covers Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and Eastern Europeans under NA-
CARA (Section 203). Part VI provides a summary of the pre-existing
status of the law of extreme hardship. Part VII presents one Immigration
Judge's perspective on the uncertainty in the procedures, rules, and
standards.
1. Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (NACARA),
Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, 111 Stat. 2160 (1997) (as amended by the Technical Corrections
to the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-139, 111
Stat. 2644) [hereinafter NACARA].
2. See CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., NACARA TRAINING 3
(1998) [hereinafter CLIN Materials].






For persons unfamiliar with immigration law, the concept of immigra-
tion probably invokes two competing images: one, the hopeful,
hardworking laborer in a tweed cap "yearning to breath free," 4 squinting
up at the majesty of the Statue of Liberty; and another, in contrast, desti-
tute families burrowing under the border, seeking to make themselves
wards of our wealth. The truth lies somewhere in between. In 1997,
140,000 aliens arrived on our shores under employment based visas. 5 Im-
mediate relatives of citizens and immigrants under the "Family Prefer-
ence System" accounted for another 235,000 and 226,000, respectively. 6
Additionally, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimates
that an additional 275,000 arrived undocumented, or "illegally."'7 Total
immigration amounts to approximately 900,000 new residents per year.8
The stories of why these people chose to come to the United States vary
as much as their numbers. The wealthiest, least taxed, freest country on
the globe should not be surprised to find that so many others wish to
partake of her riches.
But one hundred thousand reasons for entry fail to provide much gui-
dance on what to do with all these hopeful citizens. While there are some
who claim we should let in everyone without qualification, 9 the reality is
that we operate under a restricted-entry system. Not everyone who
wishes to become a U.S. citizen may do so. In order to contemplate NA-
CARA and its likely effects, it is useful to think about aliens as falling
into one of four categories: visa holders, asylum candidates, other appli-
cants, and undocumented entrants.
1. Visas
Visas are probably familiar to anyone who has traveled abroad. They
are the primary method by which a government permits entry into its
territory.10 Visas are usually pre-approved before the alien physically en-
ters the territory of the sovereign, and certain classes (e.g., tourist visas)
are often routinely granted.11 In the United States, there are two distinct
4. EMMA LAZARUS, THE NEW COLOSSUS (visited Mar. 31, 2000) <http://libertystate
park.com/emma.htm>.
5. See The National Immigration Forum (visited Mar. 31, 2000) <http://www.immigra-
tionforum.org/Familylmm.htm>.
6. See id.
7. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, INS RELEASES UPDATED ESTI-
MATES OF U.S. ILLEGAL POPULATION (visited Mar. 31, 2000) <http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/
text/publicaffairs/newsrels/illegal.htm>.
8. See id.
9. See, e.g., The National Immigration Forum, supra note 5 (calling for unrestricted
immigration). Of course, the other side of this issue is also well represented. See, e.g., The
Federation for American Immigration Reform (visited Mar. 31, 2000) <http://www.fairus.
org/html/fair.htm> (calling for a temporary moratorium on immigration).
10. See ROBERT C. DIVINE, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE § 7-2, at 67 (1999).
11. See id. at 67.
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classes of visa: immigrant and non-immigrant.' 2
a. Immigrant Visas
Immigrant visas refer to admittance petitions for persons who intend to
remain in the United States permanently. 13 These visas are further cate-
gorized depending on whether the visa is subject to a numerical quota
and whether the immigrant is an immediate relative of a U.S. citizen or
qualifies for a preferential status.14 If the visa sought is not subject to a
numerical quota, the immigrant must be either an immediate relative of a
citizen or qualify as a "special immigrant. ' 15 Special immigrants fall into
three broad categories: lawful permanent residents returning from a trip
abroad, commuter aliens, and specific enumerated classes. 16 Of the
three, lawful permanent residents make up the majority of this type of
visa.17 Commuter aliens are Mexican or Canadian residents who travel
into the United States on a daily basis for employment within our bor-
ders.' 8 The enumerated classes comprise diverse groups that Congress
has elected to encourage: ministers of recognized religious denomina-
tions, graduates of recognized foreign medical schools (meeting certain
qualifying criteria), officers and employees (and their immediate families)
of certain international organizations, and other specified persons.19
Visas which are subject to numerical limitations are used primarily for
family reunification purposes and meeting narrowly defined U.S. labor
needs. 20 At present, the total number of these visas has been capped at
270,000,21 divided into pref*erence and non-preference visas. Preference
visas are distributed in the following order and subject to percentage limi-
tations: unmarried sons or daughters of citizens; spouses and unmarried
sons or daughters of lawful permanent residents; members of certain pro-
fessions (e.g., doctors, lawyers, etc.); married sons or daughters of citi-
zens; siblings of citizens who have reached the age of twenty-one; and,
workers (skilled or otherwise) if such work is in demand in the United
States. 22 Not more than 20,000 visas may come from any one particular
country in any year. 23 Non-preference visas are limited to the portion of
the statutory cap not used by preferred visa entrants. 24 Because of the
rising number of preference visa applicants, non-preference visas are very
12. See id. § 6-2, at 59, § 7-2, at 67.
13. See id. §§ 13-1 to 13-2, at 399.
14. See id. at 399, 410, 412.
15. See Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1999) [herein-
after INA].
16. See id. § 1151(b).
17. See DAVID WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 116 (1992).
18. See id.
19. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27) (1999).
20. See WEISSBRODT, supra note 17, at 108.
21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(e) (1999).
22. See id. § 1153.
23. See id. § 1152(e).
24. See id. § 1152.
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rare; since 1978, they have been considered virtually unavailable. 25 Un-
less an entrant can prove otherwise, all persons are presumed to be immi-
grants, subject to a numerical restriction. 26
b. Non-immigrant Visas
Non-immigrant visas are issued to persons not desiring to remain per-
manently in the United States: diplomatic personnel, temporary visitors,
crew members, persons covered by trade treaties, students, temporary
workers, international organization representatives, fiancees of citizens,
and media representatives. 27 They are not subject to any quantitative re-
strictions, and far exceed the number of all other types of visas.28 In gen-
eral, non-immigrant visas are issued to certain classes of persons who will
be residing in the United States for a limited period of time, usually for
work or study.29 The formalities can be complicated, particularly in the
case of student visas, largely because each class of visa is tailored to the
needs of the alien.
Ordinarily, true non-immigrants have little intention of remaining in
the United States permanently. 30 However, non-immigrant visa holders
can adjust their status to immigrant or lawful permanent resident.31 Both
immigrant and non-immigrant visas combined account for the vast major-
ity of aliens entering into the United States each year.32
2. Asylum and Refuge
Apart from an entry to the United States by visa, hopeful immigrants
have two principal backdoor methods of acquiring citizenship in the
United States: asylum or refuge and equitable petitions. As only speci-
fied groups qualify for a preference visa,33 and the wait for a general,
non-preference visa can last for years, most potential citizens must look
to other methods. For persons under persecution from their home gov-
ernment, the threat of imminent bodily harm will rule out a patient wait
through the lengthy visa process. Aliens here illegally, even if already
partially assimilated, are barred from visa application altogether and thus
must seek an alternate route to citizenship as well.34 There are certain
provisions which might qualify a prospective immigrant for either a visa
25. See WEISSBRODT, supra note 17, at 108. In fact, the 1990 Act completely elimi-
nated this type of visa. See INA § 203.
26. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) (1999).
27. See id. § 1101.
28. See WEISSBRODT, supra note 17, at 128.
29. See id.
30. See generally id. at 129-49.
31. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1999). Aliens may also switch between types of non-immi-
grant visas (i.e., student visa to fiancee or temporary worker visa). See id.
32. See WEISSBRODT, supra note 17, at 128.
33. For example, diplomatic personnel, visitors, students, and the media all qualify for
some type of special visa. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1999). These visas, however,
do not grant automatic citizenship. Thus, the question of legal entry and citizenship are
related, but different, issues.
34. See INA § 212(a)(6)(A).
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or citizenship under an expedited review. 35 But if the alien does not qual-
ify for the visa, expedited review will only accelerate the denial of their
application. Accordingly, aliens in unusual circumstances not covered by
the routine visas may try for either asylum or other procedures.
Asylum is sought by aliens who are fleeing a nation where their life has
become unbearable, but is granted only under certain narrowly defined
conditions.36 An alien must meet one of five statutory categories before
an asylum petition will be granted.37 That is, a potential asylee must
demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of their race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.38
Refuge is also sought by aliens fleeing their native land; for our pur-
poses, it is similar to asylum. The main conceptual difference is the physi-
cal location from which the alien seeks the protection of the United
States. Asylees are generally already within the U.S. or at our border or
port of entry, while refugees are generally still in their home country or
otherwise outside the U.S. 39
3. Equitable Petitions and Private Legislation
Another alternate route to citizenship is the equitable petition. This
term covers various types of relief, usually granted at the discretion of the
Attorney General and ordinarily at the point in time where an illegal
alien faces an order of deportation. Asylum and equitable petitions are
not mutually exclusive. 40 An alien may seek both at the same time.41 For
example, if a refugee from a nation entangled in civil war were to illegally
enter the United States and be detained by the Border Patrol, he might
apply for both asylum and a suspension of deportation.
Congress can also pass bills specifically exempting an alien, by name,
from the general immigration laws.42 Bills of this nature are termed, "pri-
vate legislation" as they refer to a private party as opposed to the public
at large.43 There were ten private bills offered in the 105th congressional
session, nine of which touched upon immigration concerns.44 All nine
immigration bills passed, but under extreme factual circumstances illus-
trative of the extraordinary nature of this type of immigration relief.45
35. See, e.g., id. § 217 (governing the Visa Waiver Pilot Program).
36. See INA § 208. See generally DIVINE, supra note 10, § 16-3, at 575.
37. See INA, supra note 15 § 101(a)(42) (defining "refugee" as applied to the asylum
provisions).
38. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1999).
39. See DIVINE, supra note 10, at 571, 575.
40. See DIVINE, supra note 10, § 16-4, at 588.
41. See INA §§ 241(b)(3), 243(h).
42. See generally WEISSBRODT, supra note 17, at 88.
43. See id.






The specter of the illegal alien has haunted our immigration law since
the very first immigration legislation in 1864.46 Immigration and Natural-
ization Service (INS) regulations mandate that all persons seeking entry
into the United States, except citizens, make themselves available for "in-
spection. '47 Any person who evades inspection, or falsely claims to be a
citizen, has "entered without inspection" (EWI), and is present in the
United States illegally.48 Furthermore, an alien who has overstayed his
visa is also present illegally.49 By recent estimates, undocumented, or il-
legal, aliens number somewhere in the millions. 50
B. CONTINUED PRESENCE
1. Citizenship
For persons born within the territorial borders of the United States,
citizenship comes "naturally." Those who were not fortunate enough to
be born in the U.S. must follow one of two basic paths to citizenship:
naturalization or diplomatic accession. Naturalization is a general term
for a quasi-legislative act whereby persons not born in the United States
accede to the status of "citizen." 51 Naturalization has the effect of mak-
ing an alien a citizen, a status which may not ordinarily be altered once
conferred, except under very narrow circumstances.5 2 Grounds for de-
naturalization include refusal to testify before Congress as to the citizen's
subversive activities, membership in certain proscribed subversive organi-
zations, and illegal procurement of naturalization. 53
Diplomatic accession refers to a complicated set of rules regarding
when the child of an alien present in the U.S. under certain visa classifica-
tions may obtain citizenship. 54 Essentially, certain diplomats are not con-
sidered subject to U.S. jurisdiction and, accordingly, their children born
in the U.S. are not automatically granted citizenship.55 Instead, these
children are granted lawful permanent residence at birth, and may
thereby accede to citizenship, albeit under a different set of rules than for
ordinary lawful permanent residents. 56
46. See Alien Act of 1798 (Alien & Sedition Laws). See generally IRA J. KURZBAN,
IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 1 (5th ed. 1995); WEISSBRODT, supra note 17, at 4.
47. INA §§ 221(f), 240(b); 8 C.F.R. 235.1(d) (2000).
48. See INA §§ 241(a)(1), 275.
49. Id. § 221(g).
50. See WEISSBRODT, supra note 17, at 22.
51. See id. at 296.
52. See id. at 335.
53. See id.





2. Lawful Permanent Residence (LPR)
One step short of citizenship is the status of "lawful permanent resi-
dence" (LPR). LPR status confers the right of the alien to live and work
in the U.S. indefinitely.5 7 If an alien maintains his LPR status for a statu-
torily mandated time period, he may then proceed to naturalization. Al-
though LPR status does not completely immunize an alien from
subsequent deportation, it does eliminate any requirement that he main-
tain a visa status, or otherwise report to the immigration authorities on a
continuing basis. Maintaining LPR status includes, among other things,
requirements that the alien pay U.S. taxes and keep a home in the U.S.
3. Temporary Protected Status (TPS)
Aliens present in the U.S. who have not been able to procure entry
visas, or have overstayed their visas, are subject to deportation. 58 When
an alien has been apprehended and handed an Order to Show Cause
(why he should not be deported), he may file for Temporary Protected
Status (TPS) and thereby stay the proceedings against him.59 The general
TPS statute authorizes the Attorney General to issue a grant of TPS, pro-
vided he makes certain factual determinations. 60 TPS status is designed
as a temporary safe haven for refugees of particularly turbulent nations.61
Accordingly, the factual determinations center around unrest and strife in
the nation from which the alien flees. 62 The three disjunctive findings are
any one of either: current armed conflict (e.g., civil war); environmental
disaster which substantially, but temporarily, lowers living conditions
(e.g., Hurricane Mitch); or, other "extraordinary," and also temporary,
conditions that prevent the safe return of the alien to his native land. 63
TPS grants are limited, however, to a term of six to eighteen months, but
may be extended.64
The benefits of the general TPS statute are as generous as they are
ephemeral. An alien under TPS cannot be deported, may travel abroad
(an unusual grant, requiring express permission), may work, and may
even adjust his status (in accordance with the usual procedure) while en-
joying his stay in the United States.65 But these benefits are not handed
out lightly. Certain subclasses of immigrants may find themselves dis-
qualified for various reasons, the most straightforward of which is the
conviction of a felony or of two (or more) misdemeanors. 66 Additionally,
an alien may find his status terminated if he leaves the country without
57. See id. at 60.
58. See infra Part II.E for more information on grounds for deportation.
59. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (1999).
60. See id.
61. See DIVINE, supra note 10, § 16-7, at 602.
62. See id. at 602.
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(A)-(C) (1999); see KURZBAN, supra note 46, at 164.
64. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(A)-(C); see KURZ13AN, supra note 46, at 164.
65. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)-(c) (1999).
66. See KURZBAN, supra note 46, at 236.
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permission, fails to register every twelve months, or the Attorney Gen-
eral finds that the particular reasons for granting TPS no longer apply.67
Some otherwise disqualifying factors may be waived. 68 Other dis-
qualifiers, such as the national security and drug inadmissibility grounds,
may not be waived by INS, and will always subject the alien to
deportation. 69
The TPS statute is relatively new to immigration law.70 The 1990 Im-
migration and Naturalization Act created TPS as a replacement for the
prior, piecemeal approach to allowing otherwise deportable aliens a brief
stay in the United States.71 It is intended to be a temporary remedy
whereby the alien is authorized to delay return to his home country, not
as an alternate route to citizenship. 72 Accordingly, there are nuances of
TPS law peculiar to this intent.
Under the general TPS statute, the Attorney General may run numer-
ous programs at any one time, depending on the findings of fact applica-
ble to any particular nation.73 Occasionally, the Attorney General may
authorize special programs, under his statutory TPS authority, in an at-
tempt to organize and streamline a large group of immigrants arriving on
our shores as a result of a recent crisis abroad.74 These programs establish
a time window during which the alien must file his petition for TPS, usu-
ally 180 days in length.75 There is a such a program for Salvadorans with
some provision for Guatemalans. 76 Some of the other active special pro-
grams include citizens of Liberia, Somalia, and Sierra Leone.77
By way of example, the Salvadoran TPS program protects Salvadoran
nationals, whether here legally or otherwise, commencing for an initial
period of eighteen months, beginning January 1, 1991.78 This special pro-
gram was initiated in conjunction with the American Baptist Churches
(ABC) settlement, discussed infra, Part V.B.2. The usual ineligibility on
the basis of felony or misdemeanor convictions applied, and the alien
must have been continuously present in the U.S. since September 19,
1990.79 These aliens were permitted to work while in the United States,
but only in six month, renewable increments.80 But the registrant for the
special TPS program also found himself with an Order to Show Cause
and an appointment with the Immigration Court for a deportation hear-
67. See id. at 237.
68. See DIVINE, supra note 10, at 605.
69. See id.
70. See generally DIVINE, supra note 10, at 602.
71. See generally id.
72. See id. at 603.
73. See INA § 244A.
74. See id.
75. See DIVINE, supra note 10, at 603.
76. See 57 Fed. Reg. 28700-01 (1992); KURZBAN, supra note 46, at 168.
77. See DIVINE, supra note 10, at 603-05; KURZBAN, supra note 46, at 244-45.
78. See KURZBAN, supra note 46, at 243-44.
79. See 8 C.F.R. § 244.2, 244.3 (2000).
80. See id. § 244.12 (based on the initial TPS designation period).
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ing; emphasizing the "temporary" in Temporary Protected Status.8 '
C. DEPENDANTS OF ALIENS
The status of the alien's children may be the central consideration as to
whether the alien elects to remain in the United States and pursue citi-
zenship. For immigrants with young children, their sons and daughters
will usually be able to apply for whatever benefit their parents are seek-
ing, often on the same form. These derivative beneficiaries82 are not re-
quired to file a separate application, but instead obtain relief on the basis
of the primary applicant's claim.83 Where certain types of relief require
elaborate showings of work ability or fear of prosecution, for example,
only the principal applicant need prove his case. 84 This distinction is par-
ticularly important in asylum cases, where young children can rarely sat-
isfy the statutory requirements.8 5 Were the dependents forced to
demonstrate their own colorable claim, their petitions would be likely to
fail, leaving the parents forced to choose between their children and their
freedom.
D. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
One of the more confusing aspects of immigration law is the dual-
agency nature of the primary administrative bodies. An alien may find
himself in either Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) office
proceedings or before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in Immigra-
tion Court. An alien may, for example, file a "defensive" asylum applica-
tion with the INS while he is in deportation proceedings before an
Immigration Judge.86 Depending on the route chosen by the alien to pur-
sue citizenship, one of the two bodies will be responsible for handling his
case. 87 As certain INS proceedings may result in removal (i.e., deporta-
tion) hearings, an alien may begin his case in an INS office, only to find
himself later before a judge. Furthermore, the jurisdictional boundaries
define which body may hear which type of action.88 As the procedural
aspects of each case may be determinative (e.g., filing deadlines, route of
appeal), it is important to understand which body has jurisdiction over an
alien's case at any particular point in time. The jurisdictional rules may
also result in the alien's case being shuttled back and forth between the
INS and an ALJ several times before final resolution of his citizenship
81. Id. § 244.18(b).
82. The term "derivative beneficiaries" refers to persons whose request for relief is
ancillary to another's request. Usually, this refers to the spouse and unmarried, minor
children of the applicant.
83. See, e.g., INA §§ 101(a)(15)(K), 203(d), 207(c), 208(c).
84. See id. § 207(c).
85. See id. § 207(c)(2). For example, a young child may not have been subjected to the
same treatment that caused his parents to flee prosecution, and thus may not be able to
establish his own grounds for asylum.
86. See generally INA § 208; 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b).
87. See generally 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.2, 208.5 (2000).
88. See id. § 208.14.
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status. Sorting out the various jurisdictional rules also requires an under-
standing of the structure and function of both bodies.
The Attorney General has been entrusted with the administration of
the Immigration and Naturalization Act8 9 for all powers not expressly
delegated to another agency. 90 The Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS) is a component of the Department of Justice, and has been
delegated most of the Attorney General's authority to administer and
enforce the INA.91 More specifically, the INS conducts border inspec-
tions and exclusion proceedings of entering aliens, processes visa peti-
tions, adjudicates citizenship and adjustment of status requests, and
manages deportation proceedings. 92
Causes which may be heard at INS include: adjustment of status, immi-
grant visa requests, visa extensions, affirmative and defensive asylum pe-
titions, cancellation of removal petitions, and applications for various
other benefits under the immigration laws.93 Direct jurisdiction in initial
proceedings lies whenever the alien initiates contact with the INS for va-
rious requests (e.g., visa or affirmative asylum applications), or when the
INS elects to process aliens under administrative procedures such as re-
scission of adjustment of status.94 Indirect jurisdiction may be had when
an alien's case is transferred from an immigration court for administrative
action. 95
Some of the Attorney General's powers under the INA are also dele-
gated to the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR). 96 The
EOIR consists primarily of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and
the Immigration Courts, staffed by Immigration Judges (IJs). Appeals
from IJ decisions are taken to the BIA, with ultimate judicial review in
the federal courts. IJs may hear cases involving: exclusion and deporta-
tion, defensive asylum applications, and proceedings to rescind adjust-
ment of status. 97 The immigration courts acquire direct jurisdiction in
initial proceedings in all exclusion cases and in cases where an alien is
apprehended and prosecuted for deportation and is not already in a pro-
ceeding before the INS.98 Indirect jurisdiction may be had when an
alien's case is transferred or appealed from the INS.99
E. DEPORTATION
For some aliens, particularly those who have entered illegally or wrong-
fully overstayed a visa, interaction with the U.S. immigration laws is
89. See INA § 201(a).
90. See id. § 103(a).
91. See id. § 103.
92. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 2.1, 100.2 (2000).
93. See generally DIVINE, supra note 10, at 20.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See INA § 101(b)(4).





somewhat non-consensual. An undocumented alien is unlikely to report
his unauthorized presence to the U.S. authorities and will spend his time
in the U.S. under the shadow of pending removal. Despite the media
representations of INS raids on known havens for undocumented aliens,
there are many different ways INS can gain control of, and subsequently
remove, an undocumented alien.
As is consistent with the provisions of the INA, responsibility for en-
forcing our immigration laws begins at the border.100 The procedures and
constitutional protections afforded an undocumented alien vary greatly
with his status at the time of detection. 10 1 Generally, an alien appre-
hended at the border, before successfully "entering" the U.S. is subject to
"exclusion" proceedings. "Entering" the U.S. carries the implication of
getting past the border inspection. An alien detained at the border, at an
airport for example, has not "entered" the U.S. and, accordingly, is
treated differently from one who has established a physical presence be-
yond the INS buffer zones. An alien apprehended within the territory of
the U.S., arriving either by entering without inspection (EWI) or over-
staying a visa, is subject to "deportation" proceedings.
For aliens in proceedings after April 1, 1997, however, the above defi-
nitions no longer apply. 0 2 Under the new rules, all aliens, whether suc-
cessfully admitted or not, are subject to "removal."' 0 3 Generally,
removal proceedings are more streamlined and harder to avoid for the
alien than the previous procedures. 0 4 Removal proceedings maintain
the prior distinction between aliens who have been successfully admitted
and those who have not, although how those aliens are treated has
changed.' 0 5 Also, it is important to note that these are considered civil,
not criminal proceedings. Furthermore, as noted above, all of these pro-
ceedings take place in an administrative agency (either the INS or the
EOIR) under the guidance of the executive branch.
Because there are still many aliens who were already in proceedings
before the effective date of the new rules, it is useful to understand the
differing treatment among aliens under the prior exclusion and deporta-
tion procedures. 10 6 The main difference between exclusion and deporta-
tion, aside from the rights accorded the alien, lies in the subtleties
between the grounds for exclusion and those applicable in deportation. 10 7
The grounds for exclusion include: communicable disease of public health
significance;' 0 8 certain physical or mental disorders; 10 9 drug abusers or
100. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 235 (2000).
101. See KURZBAN, supra note 46, at 140.
102. See INA § 240(a).
103. Id. § 240(a)(3). See DIVINE, supra note 10, at 329.
104. See DIVINE, supra note 10, at 296.
105. See id. at 296.
106. The specific differences between the two processes under NACARA will be dis-
cussed in greater detail in Part V, infra.
107. See generally INA § 212(a)(1); KURZBAN, supra note 46, at 29.
108. See INA § 212(a)(1)(A)(i).
109. See id. § 212(a)(1)(A)(ii).
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addicts; 10 persons likely to become a public charge;"' certain labor-
ers;'1 2 commission of crimes of moral turpitude; 1 3 commission of drug-
related crimes;"14 prostitution or solicitation;" 15 other moral grounds;1 6
or, violation of INS laws." 7
The grounds for deportation include:" 8 excludable at time of entry;119
entry without inspection or otherwise in the U.S. in violation of law;120
failure to maintain nonimmigrant status;121 termination of conditional
permanent residence; 2 2 participation in illegal immigration activities; 123
commission of marriage fraud;124 various security grounds; 12 5 failure to
register or filing of false documents; 26 and, criminal grounds similar to
those listed in connection with exclusion, committed after entry. 12 7
As can be readily determined, deportation includes all of the grounds
for exclusion, adding significant failures to conform to U.S. laws and a
handful of other grounds, only applicable to aliens who are already pre-
sent. Finally, certain classes of aliens are excludable under expedited de-
portation processes, e.g., stowaways, suspected terrorists, and aliens
making misrepresentations to the INS. 128
With the foregoing as background, we may now turn to the Nicaraguan
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (NACARA).
III. NACARA IN GENERAL
A. APPLICATION
Before addressing the function NACARA serves, it is useful to con-
sider the context in which the statute operates. NACARA applies to
aliens who are outside the visa or asylum processes of immigration. 29 As
to Nicaraguans and Cubans, it provides an overriding route to acquiring
citizenship, regardless of any prior applications or attempts.' 30 For
Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and certain Eastern Europeans, NACARA
110. See id. § 212(a)(1)(A)(iii).
111. See id. § 212(a)(4).
112. See id. § 212(a)(5)(A).
113. INA § 212 (a)(2)(A)(I)(I).
114. See id. § 212(a)(2)(A)(I)(II).
115. See id. § 212(a)(2)(D)(I)-(ii).
116. See id. § 212(a)(9)(A).
117. See id. § 212(a)(6)(A).
118. See generally INA § 241(a); KURZBAN, supra note 46, at 81.
119. See INA § 241(a)(1)(A).
120. See id. § 241(a)(1)(B).
121. See id. § 241(a)(1)(C).
122. See id. § 241(a)(1)(D).
123. See id. § 241(a)(1)(E).
124. See id. § 241(a)(1)(G).
125. See INA § 241(a)(4)(A).
126. See id. § 241(a)(3).
127. Id. § 241(a)(2)(A)(i).
128. See DIVINE, supra note 10, at 296.
129. See NACARA Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, §§ 202(a)(1), 203(a)(5) 111 Stat. 2160
(1997).
130. See id. § 202(a)(2).
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allows only for suspension of deportation or cancellation of removal. 131
For one group, this statute addresses their citizenship directly; for the
other it merely halts deportation proceedings against them. Thus, de-
pending on the current status and nationality of the alien, NACARA will
have very different procedural and substantive consequences.
B. LEGISLATIVE ISSUES
Familiarity with the context in which the NACARA statute arose is
also useful in deciphering its operation. The Immigration Act of 1996132
changed the rules for avoiding involuntary deportation of aliens. Prior to
the Act, an alien could make one final attempt to remain in the United
States by filing for "suspension of deportation.' 33 The 1996 Act changed
the suspension proceedings to "cancellation of removal," and raised the
bar for obtaining relief. 134 One significant effect of the new procedure
was to end the accrual of time after receipt of an order of deportation. 135
This had the effect of keeping many aliens, particularly Central Ameri-
cans, from building up enough time in the United States to qualify for
many types of relief.' 36 In particular, continuous time accrual was critical
in establishing defenses to acts rendering the alien ineligible for admis-
sion. For example, "good moral character" requires a certain length of
time to pass after the commission of a crime. Ending the accrual effec-
tively eliminated the ability of many aliens to show that they had not
committed certain acts for the requisite number of years. 137
Because of the adverse consequences of the new statute, political
blocks sympathetic to the plight of these aliens petitioned their congress-
men to provide damage control.1 38 Large groups of aliens in districts vul-
nerable to challenge were able to convince their incumbent congressmen
to pass statutes favorable to their needs. 139 In one of the final acts before
adjournment, Congress passed NACARA, thus providing a favorable
piece of successful legislation on which the Representatives and Senators
could campaign during the 1998 elections.
Aside from the obvious political aspects of the statute's passage, NA-
CARA also addresses serious questions left unresolved or even caused by
the 1996 Act. The changes in the law pursuant to the 1996 Act had cre-
ated a large pool of aliens whose cases would suddenly need attention. 140
131. See id § 203(b).
132. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 1996 (IIRIRA),
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-627 (1996). (Pronounced "eye-rah-eye-rah.") The pro-
visions of IIRIRA took effect on April 1, 1997. Id.
133. See INA § 240(a)(3).
134. See id. § 240(a)(2).
135. See DIVINE, supra note 10, at 330.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See CLIN Materials, supra note 2, at 1, 107.
139. Interestingly, Haitians were not included in NACARA. Instead, they received
their own statute, the Haitian Adjustment Act of 1997.
140. See CLIN Materials, supra note 2, at 1.
1572 [Vol. 53
MINOTAUR OR MIDAS?
Whereas an alien under the old statue might wait several years under the
protection of a TPS grant, the 1996 Act ended the protective period and
required the INS or Department of Justice to reconsider thousands of
dormant cases.' 41 The subsequent backlog in the immigration courts and
at the INS alone would have warranted congressional consideration, in-
dependent of the needs and concerns of the aliens.
Additionally, the 1996 Act did not provide answers as to the status of
the aliens left unprotected. 142 It might be expected that the Immigration
Judges would adjudicate each case under the old standards, except for the
fact that the 1996 Act explicitly amended those standards without provid-
ing much guidance on the consequences of the amendments. 143 Prima-
rily, the statute did not provide guidance as to how the new "exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship" standard differs from the old "extreme
hardship" standard.144 At least as to the particular groups of aliens under
its aegis, NACARA attempts to resolve some of those status questions. 145
NACARA addresses two distinct groups of aliens in two separate pro-
visions. We begin, as the statute does, with Cubans and Nicaraguans.
IV. THE MIDAS TOUCH: NACARA FOR CUBANS AND
NICARAGUANS (SEC. 202)
Section 202 of NACARA provides for adjustment of status for Cubans
and Nicaraguans. 46 It is relatively simple in its approach, but serves also
to provide a framework by which to compare the treatment of the other
classes of aliens covered by the remainder of the statute. As a prelimi-
nary matter, it is important to keep in mind that the procedures and rules
of section 202 apply only to Nicaraguans and Cubans, not to the other
classified aliens.1 47 This distinction is easy to forget, as some of the rules
are very similar.
A. BASICS: WHO QUALIFIES AND WHAT Do THEY RECEIVE?
NACARA begins with an address to Cubans and Nicaraguans, which
are treated far differently from other Central Americans.1 48 Cubans and
Nicaraguans can apply for adjustment of status (to lawful permanent resi-
dent (LPR)) regardless of whether they had overstayed a voluntary de-
parture, were ordered deported, or were still in processing. This is as
close to a free pass as the INS ever gets.' 49 Absent an aggravated felony
or other disqualifying action on the part of the applicant, this group of
141. See id.
142. See id. at 5.
143. See id. at 3.
144. See id.
145. See CLIN Materials, supra note 2, at 107.
146. See generally NACARA Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, § 202, 111 Stat. 2160 (1997).
147. See id. § 202(b)(1).
148. See CLIN Materials, supra note 2, at 4, 109, 110.
149. See NACARA § 202(h). NACARA also applies regardless of where, or in what
type of proceeding, the alien finds himself. See id.
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immigrants is being encouraged to remain in the United States.150
As compared to the provisions applicable to Guatemalans and
Salvadorans, the first part of NACARA is quite brief.151 Certain Ni-
caraguans and Cubans "shall" be adjusted to LPR status provided the
alien makes the required showings; the Attorney General is allowed only
limited discretion as to these aliens. 152 The showings themselves are very
simple: the alien must apply before April 1, 2000, must be otherwise eligi-
ble to receive an immigrant visa, and must be otherwise admissible for
permanent residence) 53 By the terms of the statute, the mandatory ad-
justment to LPR status applies regardless of the alien's present status. 154
Thus, a Cuban facing an order of deportation who files for adjustment
will be granted LPR status as if he had never been ordered to leave the
United States.' 55 Furthermore, he need not file any other documentation
or petition except the application for adjustment of status. 156
There is some limited discrimination among the potential benefi-
ciaries.1 57 Section 202(a) applies only to Cubans and Nicaraguans who
have been continuously present in the United States, not for the usual
seven years, but only since December 1, 1995.158 This ordinarily strict
standard has also been relaxed in that the alien may have broken the
continuous presence, as long as the aggregate time abroad does not ex-
ceed 180 days, with or without INS permission.' 59 A Guatemalan who
had absented himself for that long, even over brief, sporadic trips, would
find himself ineligible for the benefits of NACARA.160 The relaxation of
the usual standard is somewhat diminished in that the INS has stated that
the 180 day limit will be strictly enforced.1 61
Section 202(a) also allows derivative claims by eligible spouses and
children.' 62 The significance of the derivative claim is that it allows the
dependents to "piggy-back" onto the application of the principal. The
derivative claim allowed for children, however, does not extend to adult
sons and daughters. 63 Unmarried sons and daughters must pursue their
own petitions unless they arrived in the United States before December
150. See CLIN Materials, supra note 2, at 2.
151. Cf. NACARA Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, § 203, 111 Stat. 2160 (1997).
152. See id. § 202(a)(1).
153. See id. § 202(a)(1)(A), (B).
154. See id.
155. See id. § 202(a)(2).
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See NACARA Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, § 202(b)(1), 111 Stat. 2160 (1997).
159. See id.
160. See id. § 203(a)(5)(C)(I).
161. See generally INS interim rule 1983-97, 63 Fed. Reg. 27823 (May 21, 1998). The
INS did not have much discretion in this declaration; the statute explicitly excludes Ni-
caraguans and Cubans whose aggregate absence exceeds 180 days.
162. See NACARA § 202(d)(1). "Child" is defined as "under twenty-one years of age
and unmarried." INA § 101(a)(15)(K).
163. See NACARA, supra note 1, § 202(d)(1)(B).
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1, 1995.164 In every case, applicants under section 202 must file their peti-
tions before April 1, 2000.165 These derivative claims are different from
the usual family-based adjustment claims, largely in that the usual
grounds of inadmissibility are waived. 166 Interestingly, for a spouse or
dependent child to qualify under section 202, he or she must also be of
Nicaraguan or Cuban nationality. 167 Derivative claimants are exempted
from the continuous presence requirement, but must meet the com-
mencement requirement. 168
An additional benefit available to Cubans and Nicaraguans exclusively
is the ability to secure a work authorization. 169 This seemingly minor de-
tail can have a critical impact on whether the alien may be financially able
to wait within our border while his application is pending. The Attorney
General is authorized, but not required, to issue a work permit to this
class of aliens while their application is pending. 170 However, should the
adjustment process take longer than 180 days, the work permit must be
approved and issued. 171 No such relief is granted to the other classes of
aliens under NACARA.172 In fact, the clock is stopped as to these aliens;
they may not even accrue the usual 150 post-filing days ordinarily availa-
ble to applicants.1 73
A final significant aspect of section 202 is that it does not require
favorable discretion on the part of the reviewing officer.174 One compo-
nent of all other suspension of deportation, cancellation of removal, or
adjustment of status proceedings is the judge's discretion.175 An alien
who is prima facie eligible for suspension of deportation must still con-
vince the immigration judge that he should be allowed to remain in the
United States.' 76 Section 202 removes this discretion, mandating that all
eligible applicants be adjusted to lawful permanent resident.177
B. PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS
1. Demonstrating Qualifications: Commencement and Continuity of
Presence
As a threshold matter, aliens seeking relief under section 202 must
164. See NACARA, Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, § 202(d)(1), 111 Stat. 2160 (1997).
Married sons and daughters are not eligible for a derivative application. See id.
165. See id.
166. See INA § 203(d) (allowing family members to adjust status as a group); NA-
CARA § 202(d).
167. See NACARA § 202(d). Spouses and dependent children must also meet the same
admissibility criteria as the principal applicant, with the same exceptions.
168. See id. § 202(d)(1).
169. See id. § 202(c).
170. See NACARA, Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, § 202(c)(3), 111 Stat. 2160 (1997).
171. See id.
172. Cf. id. § 203 (failing to mention work authorization altogether).
173. See id. § 203(f)(2).
174. See id. § 202(1).
175. See, e.g., INA § 207.
176. See, e.g., id.
177. See NACARA, Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, § 202(a)(1), 111 Stat. 2160 (1997).
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have been physically present for the statutory period. 178 However, dem-
onstrating the commencement and continuity of their presence is often
problematic, requiring documentation that an unwary alien might not
have maintained. Furthermore, the standard of proof for commencement
is different than that for proving continuity. 179 The INS has issued pre-
liminary regulations on what they will require, but these standards are
subject to change, based on the experience INS gains in administering the
statute's new requirements.180
To prove commencement of the alien's period of physical presence, he
must provide hard evidence from a governmental authority that he was
present in the United States before December 1, 1995.181 According to
INS interim rules, commencement proof requires one of the following
documents:
(1) an asylum application;
(2) an Order to Show Cause. (or evidence of exclusion proceedings);
(3) an application for adjustment of status;
(4) an application for employment authorization;
(5) Social Security Administration employment documents;
(6) any INS application which demonstrates presence; or,
(7) any document which contains proof of issuance by a federal, state,
or local government. 182
Each of the above documents must have been issued from the appro-
priate government agency.183 In the case of an asylum application, for
example, the alien's copy of his application will not suffice; the copy must
have been issued by the Department of Justice from its own files. 184 The
documents must have been dated at the time of creation and documents
from state or local governments must bear the seal of the issuing author-
ity.1 85 For aliens unable to produce any of the first six listed documents,
finding an appropriate commencement document may be difficult. Many
local governments do not even have an official seal, and many standard
state documents are never sealed.186 Finding a valid commencement doc-
ument might be the toughest step for applicants under section 202.187
The standard of proof for continuity of presence is significantly
lower.188 Here, documents are allowed from any source, governmental
or non-governmental, provided the documents refer to the alien by name,
178. Specifically, they must have been physically present in the United States since Dec.
1, 1995, and continuously present since that date. See NACARA § 202(b)(2).
179. See id. § 202(b)(1). Cf. id. § 202(b)(2).
180. See generally INS interim rule 1983-97, 63 Fed. Reg. 27823 (May 21, 1998).
181. See NACARA § 202(b)(2)(A).




186. See CLIN Materials, supra note 2, at 3, 32.
187. See id. at 4.
188. See id. at 33.
1576 [Vol. 53
MINOTAUR OR MIDAS?
and are dated and signed by the issuing authority. 189 Furthermore, the
alien may refer to documents known to be in INS files, without having to
produce a copy of the document itself.1 90 Appropriate documents might
include: rent receipts, employment pay stubs, scholastic records, religious
(e.g., baptismal) records, medical records, bank slips, or even traffic tick-
ets, as long as they meet the regulatory criteria.1 91
In the final rule, the INS modified the above requirements, keeping the
distinction between commencement and continuity documents. Com-
mencement may now also be proved by a transcript from a recognized
private or religious school that the alien attended as a child. 192 Accept-
able continuity documents have been expanded to include certified copies
of records made by certain government-chartered entities (e.g., electric
and water companies), banks, and accredited private and religious
schools. 193 And, if an alien demonstrates that his "family unit" was pre-
sent and cohabitating in the U.S., documents establishing continuity of
one family member may be used by all.194
As a practical matter, continuity of presence only requires that the
alien not have left the United States for more than 90 days at a time, or
180 days in the aggregate. 195 Brief absences of less than 90 days are not
considered significant, and therefore, the INS only requires a document
demonstrating presence every 90 days.1 96 Additionally, time spent
abroad by aliens who departed the United States with an approved ad-
vanced parole is not counted towards the 180-day aggregate.
Advanced parole is the method by which an alien asks permission of
the INS to depart the United States and retain the ability to re-enter.
Generally, parole temporarily allows aliens to enter the territory (not an
admission, only a limited-time physical presence) and is granted on a
case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or a significant public
benefit. 197 Ordinarily, departure is grounds for inadmissibility, disrupts
the continuity requirements, or renders aliens ineligible for certain relief
(e.g., asylum). As a result of ambiguity in the law in 1997, the INS is also
tolling time abroad for aliens who departed without advanced parole
before December 31, 1997 and were outside the U.S. from November 19,
1997 to July 20, 1998. An application for advance parole also tolls the
180-day counter while the application is pending. 198 This is risky, how-
ever, as the days abroad are counted if the parole application is subse-
189. See generally INS interim rule 1983-97, 63 Fed. Reg. 27823 (May 21, 1998).
190. See id.
191. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, INS Form 1-485, NACARA Supplement (Mar. 1, 1998),
OMB No. 1115-0221 (Application for Asylum).
192. See INS Final Rule 1983-97, 65 Fed. Reg. 15846, 15849 (March 24, 2000).
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See NACARA, Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, § 202(a), 111 Stat. 2160 (1997).
196. See INS interim rule 1983-97, 63 Fed. Reg. 27823 (May 21, 1998).
197. See INA § 2122(d)(5)(A).




The INS has built in some preferences for certain types of documents
under either required showing. 200 The delay in receipt of a work authori-
zation varies greatly depending on which documents the applicant
chooses to file with his petition.20 1 If the alien files his NACARA appli-
cation using INS generated documents to demonstrate commencement
and continuous presence and files his work authorization at the same
time, the work authorization will be issued with the adjustment of status
adjudication, assuming the application is approved. If he files the work
authorization request with his NACARA application, but uses Social Se-
curity Administration documents, the alien must wait 180 days after ap-
proval to receive his work permit.20 2 Similarly, if the alien fails to request
work authorization, he must wait 90 days after filing his NACARA claim
to even ask for a work permit, and must then wait an additional 180 days
for the work authorization.20 3 However, if the NACARA application is
pending for more than 180 days, by statute the alien will be issued a tem-
porary employment permit.204
Having met the calendar requirements, the alien must also meet the
other requirements: eligibility for an immigrant visa and eligibility for
permanent residence. 20 5
2. Demonstrating Qualifications: Visa and Residence Eligibility
The term "otherwise admissible" under section 202 refers to the broad
grounds for exclusion and deportation common to all immigration ac-
tions.206 Eligibility for an immigrant visa clears the alien of the exclusion-
ary grounds while eligibility for permanent residence clears the alien of
the deportation grounds.20 7
One set of procedural hurdles removed for Nicaraguans and Cubans is
a group of the standard grounds of inadmissibility. 20 8 Ordinarily, an alien
is statutorily barred from admission if he is likely to become a public
charge, has entered unlawfully, has remained unlawfully (i.e., overstayed
his visa), has arrived in the United States for employment without a labor
certification, or has re-entered the country without proper documenta-
tion.209 Under section 202, all of these grounds of inadmissibility are
199. See id.
200. See U.S. Dept. Of Justice, INS Fact Sheet, May 20, 1998, at 3 [hereinafter INS Fact
Sheet].
201. See id. at 4.
202. See id.
203. See CLIN Materials, supra note 2, at 58. See generally INS interim rule 1983-97, 63
Fed. Reg. 27823 (May 21, 1998).
204. See NACARA, Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, § 202(c)(3), 111 Stat. 2160 (1997).
205. See id. § 202(a)(1)(B).
206. See id. § 202(a); see also supra Part II.
207. See supra Part II.
208. See generally INA § 247A.
209. See INA § 212(a).
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waived.210 This is less of a boon than it sounds, because some of the bars
are waived automatically in certain circumstances. The labor certifica-
tion, for example, is waived without request in asylum cases. 211
Several important deportation grounds are not waived.212 Security
grounds, health risks, drug-related crimes, and acts of moral turpitude are
still bars to section 202 applicants.213 Significantly, if an alien has been
illegally present in the United States for more than one year, then leaves
the country and re-enters without inspection, he is permanently barred
from any relief whatsoever.214 This requirement, more than any other, is
likely to take many hopeful immigrants by surprise.
For Cubans and Nicaraguans who have already been ordered deported,
which order has been executed, 215 INA mandates a ten-year wait before
an application to re-enter can even be filed.216 NACARA maintains this
requirement, but does allow for a waiver.217 Finally, an alien who has
been deported and illegally re-enters is barred from relief under NA-
CARA altogether.218
3. Procedural Considerations
a. Initial NACARA Applications Under Section 202
How the section 202 applicant files for relief will be determined by
where the alien is in our immigration system. If the alien is unknown to
the INS and not in any removal or asylum proceedings, he simply files his
application with the Regional Service Center of the INS.219 Where the
alien is already in some type of processing, the procedure becomes more
complicated.
INA allows either the Immigration Judge or the INS to adjudicate NA-
CARA claims.220 For strategic reasons, the applicant is better off filing
with the INS. If they decide against him and place him in removal pro-
ceedings, he will get a second chance to make his case before the immi-
gration judge. Unless there are other overriding concerns, even aliens
presently before immigration judges will wish to file with the INS. For
example, children nearing the age of twenty-one (when they will have to
file their own petition) may put pressure on parents to have their cases
decided as soon as possible. The problem lies in convincing the immigra-
tion courts to relinquish jurisdiction over the aliens so that they might
210. See NACARA, Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. If, § 202, 111 Stat. 2160 (1997).
211. See INA § 212(a)(5).
212. See, e.g., id. § 212(a)(1), (3).
213. See NACARA § 202(c). For a discussion of the statutory grounds for exclusion
and deportation, see supra Part II.
214. See INA § 212(a)(9)(C).
215. Deportation orders are "executed" when the alien leaves the United States. This
would seem to punish those aliens who followed our laws and left the country.
216. See INA § 212(a).
217. See NACARA, Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, § 202(c), 111 Stat. 2160 (1997).
218. See id. § 202(c)(2).
219. See INS Fact Sheet, supra note 200, at 2.
220. See INA § 203(a).
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appear before the INS.22 1
For aliens in proceedings before an immigration judge, they may peti-
tion the court to administratively close the case, pending INS review of
their NACARA application. 222 Similarly, aliens whose cases are on ap-
peal to the BIA may request that they remand the case to the immigra-
tion court for administrative closure.223 While the INS may block
administrative closure of any case, if it does not, the court (or BIA) will
usually grant the request.2 24 In NACARA cases, the INS has stated that
it will not block closure unless the alien fails to qualify under NA-
CARA.225 If the alien subsequently fails to file his NACARA applica-
tion, the courts will automatically re-open his case. 22 6
If the alien is already in a proceeding before the INS (e.g., seeking
asylum), he may file his NACARA petition without having to close his
asylum case.227 Aliens who are still present, but have received a warrant
of deportation after a rejected asylum petition to the INS, may file their
NACARA application with the INS, but must also apply for a Stay of
Removal while their section 202 claim is pending.228 The final rule, how-
ever, provides that "absent significant negative discretionary factors," the
request for a Stay will be granted until the adjustment of status applica-
tion is decided.2 29
b. Section 202 Appeals
Should an alien be denied relief by either the INS or an Immigration
Judge, section 202 applicants may appeal that decision. 230 To whom they
direct their appeal depends on which body adjudicated the original NA-
CARA application.
The simplest case is where the application is rejected by the INS. Here,
the alien simply refiles his application for de novo review with the immi-
gration court.2 31 The court will gain jurisdiction over the alien either
through an initial deportation/removal hearing, initiated by the INS after
rejecting the NACARA claim, or by re-opening an existing case against
the alien.2 32
Where the alien filed his original petition in the immigration courts,
appeal is to the BIA.233 If the immigration court had the case on a gen-
221. See CLIN Materials, supra note 2, at 3.
222. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.13(d)(3)(i).
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See generally Office of the General Counsel, Department of Justice Memorandum,
Administrative Closure of EOIR Proceedings (Dec. 31, 1997).
226. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.13(d)(3)(i).
227. See id. § 242.13.
228. See id. § 208.3(b).
229. See INS Final Rule 1983-97, 65 Fed. Reg. 15846, 15852 (March 24, 2000).
230. See generally 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.3, 240.15.
231. See id. § 245.13(m).
232. See id. § 245.13(n).
233. See INA § 106(a).
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eral remand, the BIA will review the NACARA application as well as
any other previously pending issues.234 If the immigration court had the
case on remand for NACARA-only review, the BIA will only look at the
NACARA adjudication. 235 All other appeals from denials by the immi-
gration court must follow the usual procedures (including filing a notice
to appeal and paying the requisite fee).236 There is no judicial review of
the BIA action on appeal. However, the usual exceptions to limited judi-
cial review apply, under general administrative law (e.g., constitutional
issues).
Compared to the usual requirements for adjustment of status, the bur-
dens on section 202 applicants are relatively light. As to Nicaraguans and
Cubans, this legislation will allow most of these aliens to become lawful
permanent residents, and begin working in the United States. 237 Other
beneficiaries of NACARA, those that fall under the section 203 defini-
tions, will not find our immigration laws as forgiving.
V. THE MINOTAUR: NACARA FOR GUATEMALANS,
SALVADORANS, AND E. EUROPEANS (SEC. 203)
As mentioned above, the second half of NACARA, section 203, is radi-
cally different from section 202. For the section 203 alien, meeting the
statutory requirements is much more difficult and yields a less valuable
"prize." Two facets in particular, the "extreme hardship" and "otherwise
admissible" requirements, will make it very tough for applicants to gain
admission. Furthermore, the status of dependents under section 203 is
still uncertain, as the statute does not allow derivative claims.238
A. WHAT THE STATUTE SAYS
The second half of NACARA, section 203, applies principally to
Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and Eastern Europeans.239 The rules are very
specific as to what requirements these aliens must meet before being eli-
gible for a suspension of deportation. 240 Suspension proceedings are very
different from adjustment of status.241 Adjustment allows for eventual
citizenship after seven years of maintaining continuous residence and
good moral character, with no aggravated felonies. Suspension only
guarantees that the alien will not be deported unless they become eligible
for deportation by committing an aggravated felony.242 While suspension
234. Additionally, the alien need not file a notice of appeal; nor must he pay an addi-
tional appeal fee. Presumably, these requirements were met during the pre-NACARA
appeal.
235. Here, however, the alien must file a notice of appeal and pay the appeal fee.
236. Generally, appeals from immigration court decisions go to the BIA.
237. See NACARA, Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, § 202(c), 111 Stat. 2160 (1997).
238. See id. § 203(a)(1)(C)(i)(III).
239. Also addressed are nationals of certain former Soviet Union and other Eastern
European countries.
240. See NACARA § 203(a)(5).
241. See INA § 240(a). Cf. INA § 245.
242. See id. § 240(a).
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allows an alien to live and work in the U.S. permanently, it does not di-
rectly allow for eventual citizenship.2 43 There are other means by which
an alien can gain residence, and thereby citizenship, but for those who are
here under a suspended deportation, if they could have gained lawful res-
idence, they would ordinarily have applied for it.244
NACARA also allows for a cancellation of removal, a change of status
to somewhat less than full citizenship.2 45 The alien might never gain vot-
ing rights or other benefits accruing to full citizens, but at least will be
able to live and work in the U.S. indefinitely.246 When faced with the
threat of imminent deportation, the inability to vote may seem trivial to
these immigrants, who are thankful simply for the opportunity to remain
here. Differences between cancellation of removal and suspension of de-
portation will be covered in more detail in Part V.B.1, infra.
The mechanism by which NACARA makes these changes to the rights
of Guatemalans and Salvadorans is worth mentioning. The statute was
passed as part of the 1998 D.C. Appropriations Act.247 Essentially, it
ends the TPS and ABC protective period and returns the affected aliens
to the status they held prior to certification under TPS or as an ABC class
member. 248
Congress has drawn the beneficiary class boundaries very narrowly. To
qualify for relief under NACARA, the alien must have arrived before a
certain date 249 and have registered as an ABC class member before a
certain date,250 or have applied for asylum to the INS before April 1,
1990.251 Guatemalans or Salvadorans, even if ABC class members, who
entered the United States after December 19, 1990 and were subse-
quently apprehended, are ineligible for relief under NACARA.2 52 Com-
pared to section 202 beneficiaries, Guatemalans and Salvadorans had to
be present in the United States earlier and are granted a more limited
form of relief.2 53
In addition to the filing and registration date bars, NACARA retains
similar disqualifiers as are found in the general immigration law, some of
which are automatically waived under the statute.254 But, the criminal
and national security bars are explicitly maintained in the statute.2 55 The
details of the criminal bars tell much about our national political climate.
243. See DIVINE, supra note 10, at 329-30.
244. See id.
245. See NACARA, Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, § 203(f), 111 Stat. 2160 (1997).
246. See id. § 203(f)(1).
247. See Pub. L. 105-100, tit. II, ill Stat. 2160 (Nov. 19, 1997).
248. See CLIN Materials, supra note 2, at 107.
249. September 19, 1990 for Salvadorans; October 1, 1990 for Guatemalans.
250. October 31, 1991 for Salvadorans; December 31, 1991 for Guatemalans. ABC
Class members are discussed infra Part V.B.2.
251. Nationals of other countries have different filing requirements as they cannot be
ABC class members. See infra Part V.B.2.
252. See NACARA § 203(a)(1).
253. See supra Part IV.
254. See NACARA, Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, § 203(f)(1), 111 Stat. 2160 (1997).
255. See id. § 203(f)(1)(A)(i).
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They include ineligibility for commission of an act of prostitution within
the last ten years, anywhere in the world; trafficking in, conviction for, or
abuse of illegal drugs; conviction of a crime of moral turpitude; conviction
of a domestic violence crime or violation of a protective order; conviction
on a firearms charge; commission of terrorism or related activities; and,
an attempt to gain a benefit of citizenship by falsely claiming current eli-
gibility.256 Ineligibility under these particular bars does not render the
alien without any relief whatsoever; it merely puts the alien back under
the usual procedures (i.e., cancellation of removal). However, in order to
win relief, the alien must meet stricter standards and receives only a ten-
year suspension of deportation. 257
The other usual requirements for suspension of deportation remain in
NACARA. 258 The alien must maintain a seven-year continuous presence
in the United States, possess good moral character, demonstrate that a
return to his native country would cause himself (or other qualifying de-
pendents) extreme hardship, and otherwise merit a favorable exercise of
discretion.259
B. BASIC ELIGIBILITY
1. Suspension v. Cancellation
A basic understanding of the differences between suspension of depor-
tation and cancellation of removal is critical to understanding how NA-
CARA section 203 works. The Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) ended the previous sus-
pension of deportation procedures and replaced them with the cancella-
tion of removal provisions.260 More than just a name change, the new
cancellation of removal also changes the substantive rules for deportation
relief.261
Prior to IIRIRA, aliens facing deportation could apply for suspension
of deportation.2 62 As mentioned in Part II.E, supra, aliens apprehended
at the border, before entry, were placed in exclusion proceedings. Be-
cause of the continuous physical presence requirements of NACARA,
aliens in exclusion proceedings are unprotected by NACARA. 263 Under
the rules for suspension of deportation ("suspension"), an alien must
demonstrate: continuous physical presence for seven years; good moral
character during the entire continuous physical presence; and extreme
256. See generally INA §§ 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2)-(3).
257. See id. § 203(b).
258. See id. § 203(a)(5)(A), (f)(1).
259. See id. § 203(a)(1) (1997); Silverman, et al., NACARA's Provisions for
Guatemalans and Salvadorans: An Update, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 865, 866 (1998)
[hereinafter Silverman].
260. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 306(c), 110 Stat. 3009-627 (1996).
261. See id. § 309.
262. See INA § 240(a).




hardship, either to the applicant, or to a qualifying relative. 264 Depar-
tures from the U.S. during the seven-year period will be waived if not
"meaningfully interruptive," usually restricted to brief, casual, and inno-
cent departures.2 65 This standard has been articulated in NACARA as
departures of less than 90 days at a time and less than 180 days in the
aggregate. 266 Demonstrating good moral character is the same as for
NACARA section 202 applicants, discussed in Part IV, supra.2 67 Ex-
treme hardship under suspension of deportation is discussed in Part VI,
infra.
After IIRIRA, all aliens are processed in removal proceedings, subject
to a request for cancellation of removal.2 68 Under the rules for cancella-
tion of removal (or, "cancellation"), an alien must demonstrate: continu-
ous physical presence for 10 years; good moral character for the required
continuous presence; absence of conviction of an aggravated felony; and,
"exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. ' 269
At first glance, the new rules seem very close to the old rules, with the
simple differences of an extended time for continuous physical presence
and the absence of an aggravated felony conviction. However, several
critical changes have been made in how the requirements are met and
interpreted. First, there are new rules for determining continuous physi-
cal presence.2 70 Under the old rules, the time of continuous presence was
calculated from the date the alien entered the U.S. to the date when a
final order or adjudication of the alien's case.2 71 Under the new rules, the
continuous presence is calculated from the date the alien enters the U.S.
to the date the alien is served with notice of removal proceedings. 272 The
90/180 day rules also apply under cancellation.2 73 Thus, under the new
rules, aliens served with removal papers gain no advantage for adminis-
trative delay.
While the length of time for most aliens is extended from seven to ten
years, certain aliens qualify for a reduced showing of continuous pres-
ence. 274 Under the new rules, a battered spouse or child must only
demonstrate three years of continuous presence. 275 This classification is
less generous than it seems. The abuse must have occurred within the
264. See INA § 244(a). See generally, KURZBAN, supra note 46, at 603.
265. INA § 244(b)(2).
266. See generally INS interim rule 1983-97, 63 Fed. Reg. 31891 (June 11, 1998).
267. NACARA makes no changes to the good moral character requirement. See NA-
CARA § 202(h), 203(a)(1). See also DIVINE, supra note 10, at 336.
268. See generally INA §§ 236, 238-242.
269. Id. § 240A. See generally DIVINE, supra note 10, § 11-5(m), at 339.
270. See DIVINE, supra note 10, at 330.
271. See INA § 244(a)(1). Under the old rules, an applicant could accrue time towards
the seven-year presence even during an appeal of an Immigration Judge's final order of
deportation. See generally Cipriano v. INS, 24 F.3d 763 (5th Cir. 1994).
272. See INA § 240A. The clock also stops as of the date an alien commits an offense
which would thereby render him inadmissible or deportable. See id.
273. See DIVINE, supra note 10, at 330.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 331.
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U.S., and must have been committed by a spouse or parent who is a U.S.
citizen or lawful permanent resident.2 76 Presumably, abuse occurring
outside the territorial boundaries of the U.S. or at the hands of a foreign
national does not count.
The rules for a hardship showing under cancellation are discussed in
greater detail in Part V.C.1, infra. For the moment, the important change
is that the hardship must be as to the applicant's family, not the applicant
himself.277
2. ABC/TPS Class Members
Further complicating eligibility under NACARA, a class-action settle-
ment affects the rights of certain eligible aliens. Prior to the special TPS
program, Salvadorans and Guatemalans were treated particularly harshly
in asylum hearings. 278 Often, they were summarily dismissed without a
significant hearing or required to make evidentiary showings not man-
dated for other groups.2 79 The abuses suffered by these immigrants led to
a lawsuit, American Baptist Churches v. Thornburg280 (the ABC suit), in
an attempt to force the INS to treat Salvadorans and Guatemalans fairly.
The suit settled, and as part of the agreement Salvadorans in the United
States as of September 19, 1990, and any Guatemalans in the United
States as of October 1, 1990 were granted de novo asylum interviews. 281
Salvadorans must have applied for TPS (or otherwise informed the INS
of their desire to have a new interview) by June 30, 1991.282 Guatemalans
must have filed written notice with the INS to notify the agency of their
desire for a de novo interview between July 1, 1991 and December 31,
1991.283
Naturally, relief under the settlement agreement is more complicated
than simply filing a notice. Rejected from the class able to file under the
ABC were aggravated felons, apprehendees after December 31, 1990,
and aliens who were interviewed between July 1, 1991, and December 31,
1991.284 Obviously, the INS tried to narrow the class as much as possible.
In the Service's defense, the threat of the lawsuit, occurring before July 1,
1991, would have potentially caused the asylum officers to mend their
ways. Additionally, limiting the class to entrants before the December
31, 1991 deadline only makes sense. Why should an alien who entered
after the deadline to file for a de novo interview be a class member in a
group alleged to have been mistreated (and given an opportunity to re-
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. According to the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, only 1% of asylum cases
filed by Salvadorans and Guatemalans in the 1980's were approved. See CLIN Materials,
supra note 2, at 107.
279. See id.
280. 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991). See KURZBAN, supra note 46, at 170.






cover) when he was not even in the United States? As a procedural com-
ponent of the settlement, all pending deportations and deportation
proceedings were stayed until after the deadline date.285
C. PROBLEMS FOR IMMIGRANTS
What is particularly troublesome for the practitioner is that some of the
procedural and substantive rules are still outstanding.286 While the INS
has already spoken on the issues of when Motions to Reopen are to be
filed and has set preliminary hearing dates on the merits, there are two
critical areas of law still undetermined: the "extreme hardship" standard
and the question of "derivative beneficiaries," discussed in Part VI,
infra.287
Another critical issue, as yet undecided by the INS, is the question of
work authorizations. 288 Continued presence in the United States, while a
welcome relief from foreign persecution, means little unless supported by
the ability to earn a living. Part of the findings in a deportation hearing is
a determination of whether the alien is likely to become or remain a ward
of the state.289 Without the ability to work, it would appear that an other-
wise qualified alien is doomed to live through charity as he is specifically
prohibited from obtaining gainful employment. Until the INS promul-
gates a decision on this point, thousands of potential workers must re-
main in the care of their sponsors. In a practical sense, this requirement
alone may check the flow of immigrants into the U.S.
Often the language barrier, or lack of education generally, will lead an
alien to disregard or misinterpret a summons for his hearing.290 Immigra-
tion courts do not wait for an alien eventually to appear for his hearing,
and will readily enter an order of deportation in absentia.291 But, there is
no central recordation system for listing who has been ordered de-
ported. 292 Consequently, ABC class members may have difficulty deter-
mining if they are even eligible under NACARA, as part of the
requirement for eligibility is that they have been ordered deported. 293
The INS has spoken through the issue of an interim rule on the begin-
ning procedural issues arising under NACARA.294 The first stage of any
hearing or proceeding after an order of deportation is usually the filing of
a motion to reopen.2 95 Accordingly, it is to this issue the interim rule
speaks. Due to the short period of time in which the alien must file his
285. See id.
286. See CLIN Materials, supra note 2, at 108.
287. See Silverman, supra note 259, at 868-69, 871.
288. See id. at 867.
289. See INA § 212(a).
290. See Silverman, supra note 259, at 869.
291. See INA § 240(b)(5).
292. Records are kept at each INS Regional Office.
293. See NACARA, Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, § 203(a)(1), 111 Stat. 2160 (1997).
294. See INS interim rule 1983-97, 63 Fed. Reg. 31890-95 (June 11, 1998).
295. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(1)-(4) (2000). An alien may also file a motion to reconsider.
See id. § 3.2(b).
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motion to reopen, INS has allowed petitioners to file their motion before
filing a completed suspension application.296 Once the applicant meets
the motion deadline, September 11, 1998, he has until February 8, 1999 to
complete and file his suspension or cancellation of removal
application.2 97
1. Extreme Hardship
Even someone who has been ordered deported by an immigration
court still has some potential relief available. Congress has authorized
the Attorney General, in his discretion as head of the Department of Jus-
tice, to suspend the deportation of an alien when the alien meets certain
criteria of eligibility.298 The same statute authorizes the Attorney Gen-
eral to adjust the status of the alien to lawful permanent resident.2 99 To
qualify for the beneficence of the Department of Justice, the alien must
meet the qualifications under either of two subparagraphs of section
1254(a) of the U.S. Code, both of which require a showing of some type
of hardship. 300
The first option, available for aliens not deportable under certain speci-
fied sections of the Code, requires a showing of "extreme hardship" ei-
ther to the alien himself or to those of his immediate relatives who are
citizens or lawfully admitted permanent residents.301 This basis for sus-
pension of deportation also requires a seven-year continuous presence in
the United States and a showing of good moral character. 302
The second option under section 1254(a)(2) is reserved for aliens who
are saddled with certain statutory misdeeds.30 3 Aliens who have commit-
ted certain felonies are required to demonstrate a ten-year continuous
presence, beginning after the commission of an act which renders them
deportable, a showing of good moral character, and "exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship. '30 4
While there is room for some maneuvering as to the continuous pres-
ence and good moral character requirements, the burden of proving ex-
treme hardship has generated much litigation. The general idea behind
the suspension of deportation and adjustment of status is that, in some
cases, the balance of equities makes it unfair for certain aliens to suffer
deportation. 30 5 The extreme hardship standard is meant to separate
those aliens Congress wishes to remove from those aliens whose deporta-
tion would run counter to our notions of justice and freedom. 30 6 In this
296. See INS interim rule 1983-97, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31895 (June 11, 1998).
297. See id.
298. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1999).
299. See generally id.
300. See id.
301. Id. § 1254(a)(1).
302. See id.
303. See id. §§ 1251(a)(4)-(7), (11), (12), (14)-(18) (1999).
304. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2) (1999).




light, the statutory requirements of continuous presence and good moral
character serve as preliminary qualifications while the extreme hardship
addition makes the final cut.30 7
The factors courts consider when deciding the extreme hardship ques-
tion lean towards selection of those aliens who are somewhat assimilated
already, are contributing to society rather than existing as wards of the
state, and who would suffer a genuine loss of the sort to which aliens are
entitled to prevent, unattached to their illegal presence in the country.30 8
A closer look at the specific factors will clarify this point.
2. Demonstrating Admissibility
The statute states four basic requirements for eligibility, which are re-
peated in the interim rule. 30 9 The applicant must show: (1) prima facie
eligibility for suspension of deportation; (2) actual eligibility for suspen-
sion, cancellation or removal; (3) absence of any conviction (at any time)
of an aggravated felony; and (4) membership in one of the six enumer-
ated classes of 8 C.F.R. § 3.43(b)(4). 310
Prima facie eligibility is a fairly straightforward showing, requiring min-
imal documentation, largely because of the separate motion to reopen
and suspension application filing deadlines. Continuous presence, good
moral character, and extreme hardship form the basic elements of a
favorable suspension disposition, each of which may easily be alleged in
the motion to reopen.311
Actual eligibility for suspension or cancellation, as compared with
prima facie eligibility, is a slightly different showing.312 Here, the focus is
on the statutory requirements for either suspension or cancellation and
on the specific qualifiers under NACARA. 313 The absence of felony con-
viction is handled in the exact same manner as ordinary adjudications of
suspension applications, as is the proof of membership in one of the "six
enumerated classes. ''314 As to the classes themselves, they are the exact
same groups which establish eligibility under the statute (i.e., the time
window, ABC membership, etc.). 315
Overriding the discretionary power of the Attorney General in decid-
ing whether to grant suspension or cancellation claims in general is an
aggregate annual limitation of 4,000 aliens per fiscal year.316 For the mo-
ment, aliens admitted under NACARA have been exempted from the
307. See id.
308. See id. at 340.
309. See id.
310. See Silverman, supra note 259, at 868-69.
311. There is still some controversy regarding the extreme hardship showing. See infra
Part VI.
312. See DIVINE, supra note 10, at 613.
313. See id.
314. See infra Part VI (regarding extreme hardship controversy).
315. See DIVINE, supra note 10, at 613.




VI. THE EXTREME HARDSHIP STANDARD
A. THE OLD STANDARD
After an alien makes the required showings of qualification for suspen-
sion of deportation, he must clear one final hurdle, a demonstration of
"extreme hardship" which would warrant favorable discretion on the part
of the Immigration Judge. Because this is essentially a question of con-
vincing the court to use its discretion in the alien's favor, it tends to be a
highly judge-specific requirement, with large variance between districts.
The statutory requirements are vague, leaving most of the heavy lifting to
the court. While the requirement of "extreme hardship" is technically a
separate necessity from favorable discretion, it is often the facts that de-
termine the hardship question which tip the scale of discretion.
In terms of guidance for the Immigration Judges in making their deci-
sion, case law has developed a rough set of issues to balance. But, be-
cause each alien's case is different, the relevant law tends to provide only
examples of what will or will not survive review by the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals. The relevant factors may be grouped into five broad cate-
gories: (1) family issues, (2) psychological adjustment, (3) community
ties, (4) economics, and (5) residence.
As to family issues, it is clear that keeping families together is an im-
portant consideration. In Ravancho v. INS,318 the Third Circuit reversed
a BIA decision ordering deportation of a Philippine couple for failure to
consider family separation in conjunction with all other relevant informa-
tion, in particular the effect on a minor child with close relatives in the
U.S. In Mejia-Carillo v. INS,319 the Ninth Circuit reversed a BIA deci-
sion on similar grounds for failure to consider non-economic factors such
as family separation, in a case where the dependant children were lawful
permanent residents, living with their mother, and would be forced to
follow her back to Mexico while their lawful permanent resident father
remained in the United States.
Family separation considerations apply even where the alien is not
strictly related to the family from which he would be separated. In An-
toine-Dorcelli v. INS,32° a First Circuit case, and Zamora-Garcia v.
INS,321 a Fifth Circuit case, the courts reversed BIA rulings for failure to
consider family separation in cases where an alien had worked as a ser-
vant for, and had close "family ties" with, U.S. citizens. What is apparent
from this line of cases is that separation issues causing hardship to U.S.
citizens or lawful permanent residents carry significantly more weight
than hardship to non-citizens.
317. See id.
318. 658 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1981).
319. 656 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1981).
320. 703 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1983).
321. 737 F.2d 488 (5th Cii. 1984).
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Along similar lines, adjustment issues often concern the effect of family
separation, particularly as to small children. In Ramos v. INS,322 another
Fifth Circuit case, the court reprimanded the BIA for failing to consider
the effect of moving the alien's two small children who had spent their
entire lives in the United States to a country foreign to them, where they
did not speak the language or understand the culture.
Psychological hardship to the applicant is also a relevant factor. In
Batoon v. INS,323 the court specifically endorsed the use of medical affi-
davits demonstrating the likely psychological impact of deportation in de-
termining hardship. Furthermore, even without medical affidavits,
appellate courts are encouraging the BIA to consider psychological is-
sues. In Tukhowinich v. INS,3 2 4 the Ninth Circuit required the BIA to
consider the alien's frustrated goals in providing for her family abroad
should she be deported. Of critical importance in this case, however, was
that the alien had demonstrated that providing for her family was the
"overriding mission" of her life. 325
Ties with the community are also probative in addressing hardship. A
petitioner's community service and close relationship with a local relig-
ious congregation are relevant in determining the petitioner's integration
into U.S. society.326 Also relevant are the alien's position in the commu-
nity and his contributions in general. 327
Economic considerations are clearly probative, but not determina-
tive.328 Standing alone, the inability to find work in the alien's country of
origin is not enough. 329 However, when such economic considerations
impact upon the alien's ability to provide for his dependent family, partic-
ularly when that family is comprised of U.S. residents, economic factors
may provide additional support for hardship.330 On the other hand, the
financial status of an individual may work against the alien, when that
alien can clearly support himself in his native country. 33'
The amount of time the alien has spent in the United States is also an
important factor, although not strictly determinative. 332 In Salameda v.
INS,333 the Seventh Circuit held that a long residence in the U.S. may be
used in determining whether the alien had demonstrated extreme hard-
ship. However, in order to discourage illegal entry, simply waiting long
enough, without more, will not establish hardship.334
322. 695 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1983).
323. 707 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1983).
324. 64 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1995).
325. Id. at 464.
326. See generally Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1995).
327. See generally Matter of Anderson, 16 I.&N. Dec. 596 (BIA 1978).
328. See generally Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
329. See id.
330. See id.
331. See Matter of Anderson, 16 I.&N. at 597.
332. See Zamora-Garcia v. I.N.S., 737 F.2d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 1984).
333. 70 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1995).
334. See, e.g., Ahn v. INS, 651 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981).
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In addition to the standard factors discussed above, courts will often
use other information in making their determinations. The age or health
of the petitioner, 335 the conditions in the alien's native country,336 the
relative difficulty of obtaining an immigrant visa,337 and even the alien's
sexual orientation338 are all potentially probative.
The presence of all the relevant factors, however, does not guarantee
that the alien will satisfy the judge's standard of how extreme the hard-
ship must be to warrant relief. Furthermore, appellate courts are hesitant
to substitute their own judgment as long as the Immigration Judge has
expressly considered all of the relevant factors. 339 Thus, in order to pre-
vail in a request for suspension of deportation, an alien must demonstrate
relevant factors of the types shown above, to the degree that will satisfy
the local immigration court.
B. THE PROBLEMS RELATED TO GUATEMALANS AND SALVADORANS
Many of the Guatemalans and Salvadorans residing in the United
States, but under the threat of a pending deportation, do not easily meet
any of the extreme hardship guidelines as they stand.340 Often the lan-
guage barrier hinders their assimilation, or the rest of their family re-
mains abroad, and the immigrant is thus missing two of the more
important factors a judge will consider when granting a suspension of de-
portation.341 NACARA purports to handle this situation. There is no
clear picture of this at the moment, and the proposed regulation to date
does not provide much guidance. 342 As a practical matter, because NA-
CARA section 202 does not require any type of hardship showing, only
section 203 applicants will be effected.343 Because Guatemalans and
Salvadorans comprise the bulk of expected section 203 petitioners, any
changes to the standard will have the greatest impact on these aliens. Ac-
cordingly, the INS will have to take into account the effect on
Guatemalans and Salvadorans as such, rather than the effect on a more
heterogenous class of unknowable prospective petitioners.
C. A NEW STANDARD?
Because the newer cancellation of removal requirements speak of "ex-
ceptional and extremely unusual hardship," there is some concern that
this showing will also be harder than the suspension requirements. Addi-
335. See Matter of Anderson, 16 I.&N. at 597.
336. See Santana-Figueroa v. I.N.S., 644 F.2d 1354, 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
337. See In re S-, 5 I.&N. Dec. 409 (BIA 1953).
338. See generally Sullivan v. INS, 772 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1985) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting).
339. See generally Carrete-Michel v. INS, 749 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1986).
340. See CLIN Materials, supra note 2, at 107.
341. See id.
342. See INS interim rule 1983-97, supra note 161.




tionally, the NACARA, even while allowing aliens to use the old suspen-
sion of deportation qualifications, does not specify what will be expected
in terms of demonstrating hardship.344 Until the INS speaks clearly on
this issue, if ever, immigration courts will be forced to rely on case law
developed under the old standard. Thus, the new rules may not result in
a significant departure from the old rules, except to the extent that indi-
vidual judges interpret the new standard in a stricter fashion. Despite the
official silence of the INS, immigration courts are working to inform prac-
titioners of their intended course. An example of such outreach is exhib-
ited in Part VII, infra.
VII. PROSPECTIVE IMMIGRATION COURT
INTERPRETATIONS AND CONCLUSION
On November 4, 1998, Immigration Judge Anthony Rodgers of the Ex-
ecutive Office for Immigration Review in Dallas, Texas, spoke before a
group of practitioners at a NACARA seminar. 345 His remarks illustrate
the Immigration Court's perspective on the ambiguities in present NA-
CARA regulation.
In general, Judge Rodgers explained that while he felt that NACARA
was a politically driven and reactive statute, the need for some resolution
of the classes of aliens covered by the statute was sorely needed.346 From
a court calendar perspective, NACARA may not have much effect. In
Dallas, the immigration courts only adjudicated approximately five to six
NACARA cases, mostly very strong cases (one alien litigated, lost, and
filed a motion to reopen).347
In Judge Rodgers's opinion, NACARA puts aliens back to the pre-
IIRIRA standard. 348 For the most part, this is a hardship issue, but still
amounts to a large group of people. 349 Furthermore, location will make a
significant difference in the success or failure of a NACARA claim.350
Suspension in San Francisco is notoriously easy; in Dallas, this is not the
case.
351
Regarding the pending regulations, the consensus among Judge Rod-
gers's peers is that while judges do not know what the INS's (administra-
tive) standard will be, their main concern will be: "is it lower than the IJ's
standard?" 352 But, according to Judge Rodgers, "we will not lower the
standard; so back [the petitioners] go to the INS. '353
344. See id. § 203.
345. See Immigration Judge Anthony Rodgers, Remarks at the Catholic Legal Immi-











There is a curious procedural problem in returning the cases to the
INS. Without the pending regulations, immigration judges are unsure
how to proceed. 354 For the moment, they have tabled the cases, re-setting
every three months until they know something about the new regula-
tions.355 Until the immigration judges know something about the new
standard, these cases are on hold, unless the attorneys want to try the
case.
356
With potentially helpful regulation waiting in the wings, why proceed
to try the case? "Aging out" of a good case is one reason. 357 All the
statute does for dependants is let them "mark time" until the parents' or
principal's case is adjudicated. 358 If they no longer satisfy the age re-
quirements for a derivative claim, at the time the principal's case is adju-
dicated, the child (now adult) will be forced to proceed with his own
claim, often a very weak one.359 In Dallas, dependants' cases are being
set for trial in April 1999.360 There will be no difference in how the Js
will proceed, but after the new regulations issue, the Dallas IUs might
administratively close those cases. 361
There is also a philosophical stance evident from Judge Rodgers's re-
marks. He does not believe there is any difference in how the NACARA
statute will apply in court or before the INS.362 Only the new regulations
and certain standards (i.e, seven years, GMC, hardship) have changed;
but, those changes are effective in either forum.363 Nor does he believe
that "new language" implies a "new standard;" Congress was merely em-
phasizing the extreme nature of the relief, not the diluted form it has
become.364 Thus, different BIA panels seem harder or easier, even in
cancellation cases, because this is expected to be a case-by-case stan-
dard.365 The three Dallas judges believe "hardship" means exactly that,
not a casual or purely economic inconvenience. 366 Judge Rodgers' re-
marks underscore the highly discretionary nature of the extreme hardship
standard.
Cases involving children are particularly problematic, aside from pro-
cedural considerations. In assessing the relative merits and likely success
of many hardship cases, Judge Rodgers was able to provide some gui-
dance as to what showing should suffice, at least in his courtroom. 367 The

















older children have better roots for demonstrating the hardship of mov-
ing. 368 In Dallas, the winning hardship cases have children who are
"achievers. '369 In fact, a recent BIA case turned on a twelve-year-old
boy, his "achievements," and discomfort with the Spanish language. 370
Thus, even where there is no illness or property involved, the children are
important, and may even be outcome determinative. 371
Judge Rodgers also provided advice on demonstrating the hardship ef-
fect on the dependent children. He advises several evidentiary steps, in-
cluding introducing the children's report cards and the testimony of
teachers or counselors.372 Even so, he made quite clear that it is his belief
that there is no difference between the hardship standards of removal and
cancellation. 373 The significance of NACARA lies in who may demon-
strate hardship.374
Despite the difficulties in demonstrating hardship, the Dallas Js would
prefer to adjudicate NACARA cases, rather than send them back to the
INS.375 In general, there are three categories of NACARA cases Judge
Rodgers sees as arising in the near future.376
First, there will be remands from BIA for NACARA work. 377 In this
case, he expects the court to send notices to the alien for master docket
scheduling. 378 This poses a significant risk to the alien, particularly where
there are problems in finding respondent.379 Failing to appear will result
in an in absentia order, which will constitute a waiver of all relief, and is
non-appealable. 380 This will clearly put the alien in a worse position than
when his case was before the BIA on appeal. 381
Second, there will be a large volume of Motions to Reopen (MTRs). 382
In these cases, it is unlikely that the respondent will fail to appear, since
he will have had to contact his attorney in order to file the MTR.383 Fur-
thermore, Judge Rodgers expects these cases to be handled relatively
simply; he will administratively close the case and return it to INS for
adjudication. 384
A similar disposition is expected for the third class of cases, those pres-
ently pending before the court.385 These cases will not be terminated, but
368. See id.



















administratively closed and returned to INS for adjudication.386 Return
to INS may actually be more helpful to the alien in that the INS may
adjudicate both the NACARA petition as well as any pending asylum
claims the alien may have.387 Asylum, as noted above, is much more
helpful for derivative beneficiaries, as they are already present. 388
Overall, however, Judge Rodgers does not expect NACARA to result
in any dramatic changes in the way he handles hardship cases. 389 He will
not grant continuations to find relief; one in twenty is a "high" estimate
of his expected hardship approvals. 390 Cancellation, he asserts, is much
harder than suspension hardship, and will be reflected in his rulings.391
Thus, even while noting that he believes that the standard has not
changed, Judge Rodgers still expects cancellation petitioners to face
greater obstacles than suspension applicants.392 Because NACARA al-
lows reversion to the suspension rules, whether or not the alien qualifies
for NACARA may be determinative. 393
Judge Rodger's insight was remarkably prophetic. On May 21, 1999,
the INS issued an interim rule governing section 203 NACARA appli-
cants. 394 Among other things, the interim rule established a presumption
of extreme hardship for NACARA applicants who are also ABC class
members.395 The applicants who qualify are: 1) Guatemalans present in
the U.S. as of October 1, 1990, who registered as ABC class members
before December 31, 1991, and who were not apprehended at time of
entry after December 19, 1990; 2) Salvadorans present in the U.S. as of
September 19, 1990, who applied for TPS or ABC benefits before Octo-
ber 31, 1991, and who were not apprehended at time of entry after De-
cember 19, 1990; and, 3) Guatemalans or Salvadorans who filed for
asylum with the INS before April 1, 1990, or who filed for asylum in an
immigration court and served the INS with a copy before April 1, 1990.396
The effect of the above restrictions is that all Guatemalans and
Salvadorans who qualify for NACARA as principals also qualify for the
presumption. Aliens who only qualify for NACARA as a dependant, and
Eastern European applicants, do not receive the presumption.397
The presumption, however, is rebuttable, and will not "eliminate the
necessity of examining the evidence of extreme hardship in each case. ' '398
Instead, adjudicators will look for evidence from the record that would
386. See id.






393. See Rodgers, supra note 345.
394. See INS interim rule 1915-98, 64 Fed. Reg. 27855-82 (May 21, 1999).
395. See id.
396. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.61 (2000).
397. See id. § 240.64(d).
398. See INS interim rule 1915-98, supra note 394, at 27865.
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disprove the presumption of extreme hardship.399 Factors the adjudica-
tors will consider include:
- the age of the alien, both at the time of entry and at the time of
application for suspension;400
- the age, number, and immigration status of the alien's children and
their ability to speak the native language and to adjust to life in the
country of return;40
- the health of the alien, or the alien's spouse, children or parents and
the availability of any required medical treatment in the country of
return;402
- the alien's ability to obtain employment in the country of return;40 3
- the length of residence in the U.S.;4 0 4
- the existence of other family members who are, or will be, legally
residing in the U.S.;40 5
- the financial impact of the alien's departure;40 6
- the impact of a disruption of educational opportunities;407
- the psychological impact of the alien's deportation;408
- the current political and economic conditions in the country of
return;409
- family and other ties in the country of return;410
- contributions to and ties to a community in the U.S., including the
degree of integration into that society;411
- immigration history, including authorized residence in the U.S.;412
and,
- the availability of other means of adjusting to permanent resident
status.413
In other words, the factors are exactly those Judge Rodgers uses to
determine extreme hardship.
It is unclear what the likely practical effect of the presumption will be.
The INS, in the supplemental information accompanying the interim rule,
believes that the interim framework will balance the likelihood that ABC
class members will suffer extreme hardship if deported against the need
399. See id.
400. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.58(b)(1) (2000).
401. See id. § 240.58(b)(2).
402. See id. § 240.58(b)(3).
403. See id. § 240.58(b)(4).
404. See id. § 240.58(b)(5).
405. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.58(b)(6) (2000).
406. See id. § 240.58(b)(7).
407. See id. § 240.58(b)(8).
408. See id. § 240.58(b)(9).
409. See id. § 240.58(b)(10).
410. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.58(b)(11) (2000).
411. See id. § 240.58(b)(12).
412. See id. § 240.58(b)(13).
413. See id. § 240.58(b)(14).
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to conduct individual determinations in each case.414 Nevertheless, the
presumption of extreme hardship is an improvement over the uncertainty
in the pre-rule system.
Given the distinctly different treatment given to the two classes of im-
migrants under NACARA, Nicaraguans and Cubans are unlikely to face
any of the foregoing concerns. For these aliens, NACARA represents a
welcome relief. As for Guatemalans and Salvadorans, NACARA may
provide some relief. However, the present ambiguities in the standards
for a hardship showing and the evidentiary problems in demonstrating a
threshold qualification for NACARA benefits may dilute the statute's
positive effects to a point where they are no longer discernible. Despite
these flaws, NACARA portends movement in congressional sentiment
towards a more favorable treatment of aliens in the United States, re-
gardless of how they managed to arrive on our shores.
414. See INS interim rule 1915-98, supra note 394, at 27865.
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